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We use a newly-compiled dataset to investigate whether and why European 
Union countries implement the economic policy recommendations they 
receive from the EU. We find that implementation rates are modest and 
have worsened at a time when the economic environment has improved 
and market pressure on sovereigns has subsided. Implementation has 
deteriorated in particular among countries designated as having ‘excessive’ 
macroeconomic imbalances. We then empirically test three factors that 
could influence implementation rates: (i) the macroeconomic environment; 
(ii) pressure from financial markets; and (iii) the strength of EU-level 
macroeconomic surveillance. 
The econometric estimates indicate that larger fiscal and current account 
deficits and a higher probability of sovereign default increase the 
likelihood of implementation. However, stronger surveillance under the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) does not seem to drive 
implementation rates. The quality of governance, the fragmentation of 
government coalitions and fewer recommendations received are connected 
to increased implementation, whereas for countries under the MIP, 
implementation slowed during election years. Finally, recommendations 
on financial services have a much greater chance of being implemented, 
whereas those on broadening the tax base, the long-term sustainability of 
public finance and pension systems, and competition in services are much 
less likely to be implemented. Overall, economic fundamentals and political 
economy factors provide only a small part of the answer to the question 
of why countries reform: ultimately, reform decisions are down to factors 
outside of the models. 
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1. Introduction
During the 2008-13 crisis, the European Union significantly strengthened its tools to intervene in national 
economic policymaking, especially in order to fend off major macroeconomic imbalances. Since 2010, the 
so-called "European Semester" has become the unified framework for the coordination and surveillance of 
fiscal and structural economic policies in the EU. Initially, surveillance under the European Semester dealt 
with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the loose economic policy coordination foreseen in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU1, already in place before the crisis. However, surveillance was extended to 
encompass the newly introduced Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) in 2011. It has thus become the 
key mechanism for steering member states’ policies with a view to ensuring sound public finances, fostering 
structural reforms, boosting jobs, growth and investment, and preventing and correcting excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances. To meet these objectives, every year the European Commission prepares 
recommendations for each member state on the basis of detailed country-specific analyses. The Council 
of the EU subsequently modifies – if necessary – and adopts the Commission proposals for these 
country-specific recommendations (CSRs). National governments are then supposed to implement them. 
We investigate the effectiveness of the European Semester: do member states actually implement CSRs? And 
what determines implementation? We focus in particular on recommendations given in the context of 
macroeconomic imbalances and structural issues. 
Studying drivers of economic reform is particularly interesting in the case of the EU. Its macroeconomic 
surveillance framework is one of the core policy processes of the EU and, unlike International Monetary Fund or 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development surveillance, is based on a strong legal framework that 
encompasses enforcement mechanisms. Every year, in the context of the MIP, the European Commission 
classifies member states into three imbalances categories based on the gravity of macroeconomic imbalances: 
no imbalances, imbalances and excessive imbalances2. Countries under the MIP (placed in the latter two 
categories) receive MIP-relevant recommendations3 and are subject to tighter EU monitoring. In addition, under 
EU law, non-compliance by euro-area countries judged to be facing excessive macroeconomic imbalances can 
even result in financial sanctions4. It should be emphasised that countries under financial assistance 
programmes are not covered by the MIP and do not receive CSRs in order to avoid duplication. Moreover, reforms 
in the EU and in particular in the euro area are of particularly great importance. In a highly interconnected EU and 
in the absence of the nominal exchange rate as a mechanism of adjustment, spillover effects from national 
economic policies become particularly significant. It therefore matters whether or not countries implement 
reforms that are agreed at EU level – and it is important to understand what ultimately drives these reforms. 
We first document implementation rates in different countries and find that progress with implementation of 
recommendations is modest and has significantly deteriorated in the course of the last six years. We then want 
to understand why this is the case. What determines the degree to which policymakers implement 
recommendations? Our econometric estimates test three basic hypotheses: does implementation improve 
when EU monitoring becomes tighter and sanctions loom large? Do implementation rates improve when 
economic fundamentals are weak? Does financial market pressure increase implementation rates?  
1 This coordination follows the Integrated Guidelines (broad economic policy guidelines (BEPG) and employment guidelines) of the 
Council, which since 2010 have changed only once (in 2015) and reflect the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth. 
2 The categorisation of imbalances was temporarily changed in 2014 and 2015, when countries with imbalances were split into three 
sub-categories: imbalances that require policy action and monitoring; imbalances that require decisive policy action and monitoring; and 
imbalances that require decisive policy action and specific monitoring. 
3 CSRs cover the European Semester broadly, i.e. including the coordination under the Integrated Guidelines and even the SGP. The CSRs 
that are partly or wholly relevant for macroeconomic imbalances are tagged as such (at the aggregate CSR-level) in the recitals of the 
recommendations. 
4 MIP-relevant CSRs is the policy instrument of the MIP under its preventive arm, for countries with imbalances and excessive imbalances 
alike. For the corrective arm of the MIP – the so-called Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) – to be launched, identification of excessive 
imbalances is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Indeed, so far, the EIP has never been opened for countries with excessive 
imbalances. 
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Only a few empirical studies have investigated the determinants of implementation of the EU’s country-specific 
recommendations. To the best of our knowledge, the only econometric analysis was carried out by the European 
Commission (2016)5 and is limited to recommendations given to a subset of countries6 between 2014 and 
2015. The likelihood of implementation is found to be higher after elections, lower when elections are 
forthcoming, and higher when countries’ imbalances are classified as more serious as part of the MIP (Brincogne 
and Turrini, 2017).  
The broader literature on drivers of economic reform converges on the point that implementation is generally 
affected by the macroeconomic environment, external and market pressure and political factors, although the 
exact findings vary from study to study.     
Reforms are more likely to occur during times of crisis. Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Drazen and Easterly (2001) 
listed possible reasons. First, crises change perceptions about the need for reform. A large deterioration in the 
status quo might be required to overcome the concerns, biases and incentives against reform given its 
distributional consequences for individuals and interest groups7. Second, crisis-related uncertainty might be 
required to reduce the political myopia of incumbent politicians, who tend to underinvest in politically costly 
policies in the short-term (Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013). Finally, economic crises can weaken powerful, 
resistant interest groups. Agnello et al (2015) documented the association between different types of crisis and 
subsequent reform: external debt crises tend to drive financial, banking and trade reforms; inflation crises tend 
to trigger external capital account reforms; banking crises seem to precipitate financial reforms and external 
capital account reforms. 
Empirical studies have found evidence that the macroeconomic environment is related to the implementation of 
structural reforms. In particular, recessions (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006; Hoj et al, 2006, for product market 
reforms; Agnello et al, 2015, for financial, capital, banking and trade reforms; and Da Silva et al, 2017, for EPL 
reforms and reducing FDI barriers), high unemployment rates (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006; Hoj et al, 2006; Da 
Silva et al, 2017, for EPL) and low potential economic growth (Da Silva et al, 2017 for EPL, product market and 
business environment reforms) have been all been found to increase the likelihood of implementation. 
Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2016) also found that economic uncertainty, measured as the volatility of stock market 
returns, has a positive and significant effect on the adoption of reforms. 
Furthermore, macroeconomic stabilisation policies, ie fiscal policy and monetary policy, have been tested for 
their effects on structural reform implementation. Higher fiscal balances increase the likelihood of 
implementation (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006; Hoj et al, 2006). Higher short-term interest rates appear to have 
the opposite effect (Da Silva et al, 2017). Moreover, fiscal consolidation appears to delay structural reform (Hoj 
et al, 2006) or to have mixed effects depending on the policy field (Da Silva et al, 2017).   
Last but not least, the literature has considered the effects of political and institutional factors. Reform 
implementation does not appear to be less during an election year per se (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006), although 
it is more likely when governments are at least two years into their terms (Hoj et al, 2006). With regards to veto 
power and political fragmentation, results are mixed: Agnello et al (2015) found that adoption of product market 
reforms is associated with greater political fragmentation, whereas Da Silva et al (2017) found that one-party 
governments with majorities in all houses of parliament tend to implement more reforms. In addition, Hoj et al, 
(2006) found that the political ideology of the government, in particular a right-of-centre orientation, can 
increase the likelihood of structural reform implementation. Reform implementation is also more likely when 
some form of external pressure is applied, in particular conditions attached to financial assistance programmes 
                                                          
5 Deroose and Griesse (2014) were the first to present descriptive evidence on the implementation of CSRs. 
6 Countries for which an in-depth review (IDR) was prepared in both 2014 and 2015. 
7 Reforms can be delayed when socioeconomic groups engage in a ‘war of attrition’, wishing not to bear the reform’s cost and to shift it to 
other groups (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Reform adoption will also be prevented by ex-ante uncertainty over individual gains and losses 
from efficiency-enhancing reform (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). 
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(Da Silva et al, 2017) or the EU single market programme (Hoj et al, 2006; Da Silva et al, 2017). On the other 
hand, Da Silva et al (2017) did not find evidence that financial market pressure promotes implementation. 
The next section presents our new dataset and provides the first key statistics. In section 3, we discuss our 
empirical approach while section 4 shows the econometric estimates of the drivers of reforms. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Implementation of CSRs: what do the data show? 
2.1. The dataset  
We compiled our new dataset from the European Commission’s publicly available Country Reports. The dataset 
contains for every recommendation its text, the year in and country to which it was addressed, and the progress 
made by the country in implementing it. This implementation score, which is our dependent variable, is 
evaluated by the European Commission and takes the form of an ordered, categorical variable translating 
implementation into a five-point scale: no progress, limited progress, some progress, substantial progress and 
full implementation. This assessment has been accepted as accurate by the members of the Economic Policy 
Committee – a group of officials from member states that supports the work of ECOFIN (European Court of 
Auditors, 2018). Appendix A gives further information on these scores.  
We assign each recommendation to one or several codified policy area(s) for which it is relevant. For instance, 
recommendations on collective bargaining, wage indexation and minimum wage regimes are codified as being 
relevant for ‘wages and wage-setting’. This type of matching is also carried out by the European Commission but 
is not made public. We used the same list of 32 policy areas as the European Commission (Appendix B) and 
carried out basic statistical comparisons that showed that our classifications correspond closely to the 
European Commission’s. The observations in our dataset are the so-called subparts of CSRs, so they refer to 
specific recommendations such as “further reduce the regulatory burden for firms, including by pursuing the 
simplification programme”8. 
The resulting dataset is three-dimensional and nested: every recommendation, indexed by j, corresponds to 
year t and country i. The dataset covers all the recommendations addressed to member states from 2013 to 
2018, except those related to fiscal targets based on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)9, for which 
implementation scores are not available. The total number of observations is 1901.   
Finally, we matched at the country-year level the dataset of recommendations with the explanatory variables. 
These can be divided into four sets: a) macroeconomic data; b) market measures of sovereign risk; c) political 
variables; and d) the classification of countries into categories of macroeconomic imbalances in the context of 
surveillance under the MIP. 
The macroeconomic data comes from the European Commission’s AMECO database and the IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO). We used the real-time vintages of the macroeconomic variables, ie the values for year t come 
from the Spring Economic Forecast of the European Commission of year t+1 (published in May) and the WEO 
published in April. These vintages represent the information available as of the time recommendations were 
adopted, without subsequent revisions. Market measures of sovereign risk (ie sovereign default probability, 5-
year credit default swap (CDS) spreads) were obtained from Bloomberg. The sources of the political variables 
are the Database of Political Institutions 2017 and the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators. The variables 
are described in detail in Appendix C. 
                                                          
8 To illustrate with an example, the text of CSR 4 to France in 2017 read “Further reduce the regulatory burden for firms, including by 
pursuing the simplification programme. Continue to lift barriers to competition in the services sector, including in business services and 
regulated professions. Simplify and improve the efficiency of public support schemes for innovation”. Each sentence of this CSR is a 
subpart.  
9 The sample also excludes subparts that simply ask countries to comply with financial assistance programme requirements (this was 
the case for Romania in 2013, 2014 and 2015). 
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2.2. Descriptive evidence 
In aggregate10, from 2013 to 2018 member states made ‘limited progress’ or ‘some progress’ with the 
recommendations they received as part of the European Semester (Figure 1). This means that on average 
member states fell short in terms of adopting measures to at least partly address the recommendations or to 
follow up on the adoption of those measures with implementation. Worse, implementation of recommendations 
worsened over time. Darvas and Leandro (2015, 2016) found similar results for implementation at the CSR level 
from 2011-15. The deterioration in the implementation records of member states was confirmed by a series of 
robustness checks (such as country composition, see Efstathiou and Wolff, 2018). Implementation rates have 
fallen substantially since 2014, with an additional sharp drop taking place in 2018. 
Figure 1: Average implementation score: all recommendations, MIP-relevant recommendations and recommendations to countries 
with excessive imbalances 
 
Note: The countries shown have at least 10 subparts under each legal basis. Scores: no progress=0, limited progress=25, some 
progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100). 
But do countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances comply more with recommendations? One would 
expect countries with excessive imbalances to implement the recommendations more rigorously because their 
imbalances are a particularly relevant concern. And indeed, in 2013-15, implementation scores were better. 
However, the decline in implementation since then has been more substantial among member states facing 
excessive imbalances (Figure 1). Reasons for this decline in implementation could include the improved 
economic environment and the reduction of market pressure.  
Furthermore, there was no systematic difference in implementation between MIP-related recommendations and 
recommendations based on looser economic policy coordination that are not backed up by the possibility of 
sanctions (Figure 2). At first sight, it doesn’t seem that the macroeconomic imbalances procedure has made an 
actual difference in terms of national policy action. 
                                                          
10 We adopted a numerical scale for the implementation scores, ranging from 0 to 100 (no progress=0, limited progress=25, some 
progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100) and computed average scores.   
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Figure 2: Average implementation score by country 2013-18, MIP-relevant vs. non MIP-relevant recommendations 
 
Note: The countries shown have at least 10 subparts under each legal basis. Scores: no progress=0, limited progress=25, some 
progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100). The countries shown have at least 10 subparts under each legal basis. 
Meanwhile, implementation varied substantially between countries and policy areas from 2013-17. The 
countries with the highest implementation scores (see Figure 3) were the United Kingdom (51), Finland (49), 
Slovenia (46), Malta (45) and Ireland (43). Implementation was lowest in Luxembourg (23), Hungary (28), 
Slovakia (30), Germany (30) and Sweden (31). 
Figure 3: Average implementation score 2013-18, by country  
 
Note: The countries shown have at least 10 subparts under each legal basis. Scores: no progress=0, limited progress=25, some 
progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100). 
Implementation scores by policy area (Figure 4) are on average high for the financial sector (financial services: 
53; private indebtedness: 46; access to finance: 45; and the insolvency framework: 44), skills and life-long 
learning (42) and childcare (41). However, recommendations related to taxation, such as on broadening the tax 
base (22) or reducing the debt bias (22), competition in services (26) and reforms focused on unemployment 
benefits (29) and the long-term sustainability of public finances including pensions (29), are poorly 
implemented overall. 
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Figure 4: Average implementation score 2013-18, by policy area 
 
Note: The countries shown have at least 10 subparts under each legal basis. Scores: no progress=0, limited progress=25, some 
progress=50, substantial progress=75, fully implemented=100). 
The overall picture is thus one of deteriorating implementation of reform recommendations during a period 
during which market pressure was subsiding and the economy was improving in general. Moreover, EU 
recommendations given in the context of tighter surveillance, which provides for enforcement mechanisms in 
case of non-compliance, do not seem on average to have had higher implementation rates. These broad 
observations suggest that the effectiveness of the European Semester might be rather limited, but only an 
econometric analysis can assess this. This is what we turn to in the remainder of the paper. 
3. Model 
We tested the hypotheses on the drivers of CSR implementation by running ordered logistic regressions. Our 
choice of this model was justified by the nature of our dependent variable, which is categorical and ordered. The 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗 , which takes on values 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, is linked to a continuous, latent variable 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗  defined on the real numbers’ line according to the following rule:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘 ⟺  𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘−1 < 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 ,∀𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4},𝜇𝜇−1 = −∞,𝜇𝜇4 = ∞ . 
The basic equation specified for the latent variable is of the form:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡′𝛽𝛽 + 1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗[𝑝𝑝=𝑝𝑝0]′𝛿𝛿 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗 , 
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in which nearly all regressors (the 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡) vary only at the country-year level, with the exception of the index 
function 1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗[𝑝𝑝=𝑝𝑝0], which takes the value of 1 if subpart 𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑗𝑗 is relevant for policy area 𝑝𝑝0. Finally, to close the 
model, the error is assumed to be homoscedastic and have a logistic cumulative distribution function: 
𝑃𝑃[𝜀𝜀 ≤ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗] =  𝛬𝛬�𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗� = exp {𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗}1+exp {𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗}. 
Maximum likelihood estimates ?̂?𝛽,𝛿𝛿 capture the direction and statistical significance of the effect of the 
regressors on the likelihood of implementation. This suffices to test the main hypotheses we are interested in: 
first, that the likelihood of implementing recommendations is influenced by macroeconomic fundamentals; 
second, that pressure from financial markets, captured by measures of sovereign default risk, incentivises 
implementation; third, that stronger macroeconomic surveillance at the EU level, captured by the classification 
of countries into imbalances categories, increases the probability of implementing recommendations. The 
remaining variables, including the policy-area dummies, act as control variables. 
However, the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted as the associated marginal effect. Indeed, the 
key predictions of the fitted model are the conditional (on the values of 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗) probabilities that the degree of 
implementation of recommendation 𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑗𝑗 is 𝑘𝑘 (for each 𝑘𝑘)  
𝑃𝑃��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘| 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗� = 𝛬𝛬�?̂?𝜇𝑘𝑘 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾�� − 𝛬𝛬�?̂?𝜇𝑘𝑘−1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾��. 
Therefore, to interpret the ‘economic’ significance we also present the average marginal probability effect 
(AMPE) for 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 of each regressor. 
Three remarks are in order. First, the effect of the MIP is tested by inserting dummy variables for the categories 
of imbalances, so to avoid perfect collinearity the ‘no imbalances’ category serves as the base and is dropped, 
and any effects are relative to it. We also tested and report a Wald test for the null that the dummies for the 
‘imbalances’ and ‘excessive imbalances’ categories are equal. Second, in two cases11 countries that did not take 
part in the MIP cycle – meaning their imbalances were not assigned into categories – received CSRs 
nonetheless. These recommendations were, therefore dropped from the sample, reducing the number of 
observations from 1901 to 1816. Third, in the basic equation we restricted the slope coefficients to the same for 
all countries and recommendations. We relaxed this assumption by also running the regression separately on 
the sample of countries in the MIP (imbalances and excessive imbalances) and the sample of countries not in 
the MIP (without imbalances). 
In addition, we faced a number of potential problems and, as a result, either modified the equations or ran 
robustness checks to address them. First, there can be reverse causality from implementation of 
recommendations to the macroeconomic regressors and the measures of sovereign risk. We addressed this 
issue in all specifications by lagging the macroeconomic variables by one year, while for measures of sovereign 
risk we took the averages from January to May, ie the five months prior to the adoption of CSRs. Secondly, to 
confront the possibility of omitted variable bias, we extended the basic equation with time and country fixed 
effects (Appendix D). Third, overall implementation at the country level is persistent, so in a robustness check 
we added the lagged average implementation score to the basic specification. Finally, the error might be 
heteroscedastic. Importantly, heteroscedasticity in discrete response models can also render the parameters 
biased and inconsistent (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985). We clustered standard errors at the country-year level, 
but as a robustness check we specified an ordered logit with a heteroscedasticity equation (see Williams, 
2010), modelling the error term’s variance as a function of country and policy areas dummies (see Appendix D). 
                                                          
11 These were: Portugal in 2014 because of the termination of its programme in between the two cutoff dates (February for categorisation 
of imbalances and June for CSRs); and Romania in 2013 and 2014 because it was under a precautionary balance of payments 
programme. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
Three main results emerge from our basic equation (Table 1). First, economic fundamentals matter:  countries 
with high public and external deficits are more likely to implement recommendations. Second, financial market 
pressure increases the probability of implementation. However, this result is sensitive to the choice of variable: 
the coefficient on the 1-year sovereign default probability is positive and statistically significant but when the 5-
year credit default swap (CDS) spread takes its place, statistical significance vanishes. Third, there is no 
evidence that the classification of countries in the MIP mattered for implementation. The categorisation in either 
one of the MIP categories, ie the imbalances or the excessive imbalances category, does not result in a 
statistically significant effect compared to countries classified as having no imbalance. The difference in 
implementation between imbalances and excessive imbalances is not statistically significant either.   
Furthermore, we find three robust results among the control variables. First, higher governance quality – which 
includes the government effectiveness measure among others – increased the probability of implementation. 
Second, more fragmented governments – in terms of a larger number of parties participating and their more 
equal representation in parliament – were more likely to make further progress with recommendations, possibly 
reflecting greater diffusion of the political cost and/or ownership of the reform agenda. Third, a lower number of 
recommendations received by a country in a given year resulted in better implementation per recommendation. 
Turning to the policy-area dummies (Table 2), the probability of implementation is greater if the 
recommendation was relevant for financial services (at the 1 percent confidence level), access to finance, 
energy, resources and climate change, the fight against tax evasion, improving the tax administration and 
tackling tax avoidance, health and long-term care, incentives to work, job creation and labour market 
participation, and skills and lifelong learning (at least at the 10 percent confidence level). On the contrary, it is 
lower if the recommendation concerned broadening the tax base, competition in services, the long-term 
sustainability of public finances, including pensions (all at the 1 percent confidence level), poverty reduction 
and social inclusion, telecom, postal services and local public services, transport, and reducing the debt bias (at 
least at the 10 percent confidence level). 
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Table 1: Ordered logistic regression results 
 All All MIP MIP non MIP non MIP 
Dependent variable: implementation score       
Imbalances 0.24 0.23     
 (1.43) (1.38)     
Excessive imbalances 0.26 0.38 -0.06 0.12   
 (1.09) (1.56) (0.36) (0.62)   
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged] 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 
 (0.62) (0.32) (0.62) (0.07) (0.59) (1.29) 
Expected real GDP growth 5 years out (%) 0.11 0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 
 (1.06) (0.37) (0.55) (0.18) (0.72) (0.23) 
General government net lending (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.21*** 0.09 0.10 
 (6.15) (6.83) (8.17) (8.88) (1.27) (1.47) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.05** -0.05*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.10** -0.12*** 
 (2.57) (2.61) (1.59) (1.43) (2.34) (2.92) 
1Y sovereign default probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 0.10***  0.08***  0.28**  
 (3.04)  (2.63)  (2.15)  
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-May)]  -0.00  -0.00  0.02*** 
  (0.04)  (1.42)  (4.05) 
Election year -0.22 -0.19 -0.38** -0.29* -0.05 -0.14 
 (1.64) (1.32) (2.49) (1.79) (0.21) (0.67) 
Average of World Governance Indicators estimates 0.93*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.43* 0.90** 1.29*** 
 (4.08) (3.24) (2.83) (1.79) (2.20) (3.21) 
Herfindahl Index of Government Parties -0.56** -0.65** -0.31 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 
 (2.11) (2.39) (0.65) (0.50) (0.87) (0.75) 
Number of subparts -0.02** -0.02* -0.03** -0.02* -0.02 -0.03** 
 (2.55) (1.81) (2.45) (1.93) (1.43) (2.47) 
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.076 0.086 0.084 0.103 0.109 
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. chi-sq. 0.01 0.61     
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. p-value 0.90 0.43     
Observations 1816 1816 1102 1102 714 714 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
Notes: Includes policy area dummies. Country-year clustered standard errors. 5Y CDS for Luxembourg and Malta are Bloomberg model estimates. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 2: Ordered logistic regression policy-area dummies 
 All All MIP MIP non MIP non MIP 
Dependent variable: 
implementation score 
      
Access to finance 0.58* 0.66* 0.37 0.48 1.93*** 1.94*** 
 (1.66) (1.82) (0.96) (1.19) (4.48) (4.14) 
Financial services 1.67*** 1.67*** 1.53*** 1.54*** 2.06** 2.05** 
 (6.27) (6.29) (5.26) (5.36) (2.02) (2.10) 
Housing market -0.29 -0.25 -0.27 -0.22 0.14 0.09 
 (0.72) (0.61) (0.55) (0.45) (0.25) (0.17) 
Private indebtedness -0.38 -0.29 -0.22 -0.10 -1.67*** -1.68*** 
 (0.82) (0.64) (0.46) (0.21) (3.75) (3.83) 
Active labour market policies 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.16 
 (0.80) (0.97) (0.52) (0.70) (0.54) (0.48) 
Employment protection legislation 
and framework for labour contracts 
-0.47 -0.45 -0.12 -0.13 -1.64** -1.55** 
 (1.24) (1.16) (0.28) (0.29) (2.15) (2.02) 
Incentives to work; job creation; 
labour market participation 
0.27* 0.27* 0.15 0.14 0.65*** 0.63*** 
 (1.92) (1.90) (0.76) (0.71) (2.70) (2.63) 
Unemployment benefits -0.37 -0.39 -0.69 -0.83 -0.40 -0.54 
 (0.76) (0.77) (0.94) (1.10) (0.94) (1.19) 
Wages and wage-setting -0.40 -0.45 -0.21 -0.29 -1.24 -1.32 
 (1.41) (1.57) (0.74) (0.98) (1.50) (1.59) 
Business environment -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 0.26 0.41 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.29) (0.26) (0.84) (1.35) 
Civil justice -0.13 -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 0.25 0.31 
 (0.63) (0.47) (0.64) (0.45) (0.51) (0.65) 
Insolvency framework 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.72 0.59 
 (1.35) (1.25) (0.95) (0.84) (1.13) (0.93) 
Public administration -0.15 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.22 -0.18 
 (0.88) (0.90) (0.52) (0.50) (0.76) (0.62) 
Shadow economy and corruption -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.15 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.28) (0.34) 
State-owned enterprises -0.06 -0.07 -0.37 -0.36 2.29* 2.41* 
 (0.18) (0.19) (1.16) (1.13) (1.73) (1.86) 
Broaden the tax bases -1.71*** -1.68*** -1.42*** -1.38*** -2.25*** -2.24*** 
 (6.67) (6.54) (3.97) (3.77) (4.99) (5.08) 
Fight against tax evasion; improve 
tax administration & tackle tax 
avoidance 
0.45** 0.44** 0.16 0.13 1.04*** 1.06*** 
 (2.23) (2.14) (0.56) (0.46) (3.27) (3.33) 
Fiscal policy and fiscal governance -0.05 -0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.26 -0.19 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.29) (0.17) (0.48) (0.35) 
Long-term sustainability of public 
finances; including pensions 
-1.13*** -1.12*** -0.62** -0.64** -1.63*** -1.56*** 
 (5.34) (5.35) (2.28) (2.35) (4.23) (4.13) 
Reduce the debt bias -1.30* -1.27* -1.33* -1.31 -1.11*** -1.34*** 
 (1.80) (1.71) (1.67) (1.59) (2.79) (3.47) 
Reduce the tax burden on labour 0.28 0.26 0.04 -0.03 1.10** 0.98* 
 (1.11) (1.00) (0.14) (0.12) (2.15) (1.89) 
Childcare 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.37 0.48 
 (1.24) (1.26) (0.54) (0.72) (0.95) (1.17) 
Education -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
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 (0.11) (0.22) (0.30) (0.22) (0.18) (0.25) 
Health and long-term care 0.54** 0.52** 0.21 0.25 1.01*** 0.98*** 
 (2.46) (2.39) (0.70) (0.83) (2.75) (2.73) 
Poverty reduction and social 
inclusion 
-0.34* -0.34** -0.43* -0.44* -0.18 -0.18 
 (1.94) (1.99) (1.82) (1.89) (0.63) (0.62) 
Skills and life-long learning 0.32** 0.32** 0.13 0.10 0.75*** 0.78*** 
 (2.02) (2.06) (0.57) (0.44) (3.35) (3.36) 
Competition and regulatory 
framework 
-0.38 -0.37 -0.46 -0.45 -0.32 -0.42 
 (1.09) (1.04) (1.22) (1.17) (0.31) (0.40) 
Competition in services -1.13*** -1.14*** -1.18*** -1.22*** -1.06** -1.07** 
 (4.44) (4.54) (3.54) (3.77) (2.40) (2.39) 
Energy; resources and climate 
change 
0.50** 0.49** 0.34 0.30 0.95*** 0.92*** 
 (2.25) (2.21) (1.11) (0.98) (3.23) (3.12) 
Research and innovation -0.13 -0.09 -0.35 -0.37 0.10 0.11 
 (0.65) (0.45) (1.32) (1.27) (0.35) (0.36) 
Telecom; postal services and local 
public services 
-0.77** -0.70* -1.12** -1.09** 0.24 0.15 
 (2.07) (1.95) (2.26) (2.26) (0.40) (0.26) 
Transport -0.57** -0.54** -0.07 -0.02 -1.20*** -1.18*** 
 (2.36) (2.20) (0.23) (0.05) (3.42) (3.31) 
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.076 0.086 0.084 0.103 0.109 
Observations 1816 1816 1102 1102 714 714 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
Notes: Includes policy area dummies. Country-year clustered standard errors. 5Y CDS for Luxembourg and Malta are 
Bloomberg model estimates. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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For the separate regressions we ran for recommendations to countries under the MIP and to countries without 
macroeconomic imbalances (third to sixth columns of Table 1), the results reported above remain broadly 
unchanged with three notable exceptions. First, among countries in the no-imbalances category, the coefficient 
on the general government balance switches sign and becomes positive, whereas among the MIP countries the 
finding that higher deficits led to better implementation of recommendations remains negative and is strongly 
statistically significant. Second, also among the MIP countries, implementation slowed during election years. 
Third, the coefficient on the 5-year CDS spread is statistically significant and positive for the no-imbalance 
category sample. 
Overall, these results suggest that predicting the likelihood of reforms is a difficult exercise. In fact, the model’s 
pseudo R-squared is only 8 percent and on average a 1 percentage point (pp) reduction in the public deficit is 
only associated with a 2 pp or 3 pp decrease in the likelihood of making ‘some progress’ with a recommendation 
(Appendix E, Table 3). This is hardly surprising given that most of the variation is within countries and across 
recommendations while most of our explanatory variables vary only across countries. Of course, every 
recommendation has particular aspects that matter for policymakers when deciding to implement them. But 
these are very hard to capture or are downright unobservable, so the assumption is that they are random and 
logistically distributed. All that can be said is that these characteristics account to a great extent for countries’ 
decisions to implement reforms.   
However, the model still indicates that economic fundamentals matter for the implementation of 
recommendations. Larger government and current account deficits, as well as market pressure, are associated 
with a greater likelihood of reform. Larger public and external deficits were either the root cause or the symptom 
of the European debt crisis, so member states that were vulnerable because of these fundamentals might have 
had little choice but to implement recommendations. However, when fiscal consolidation and external 
adjustment were complete, implementation rates dropped. This can be interpreted as the ‘crisis effect’. The 
same interpretation holds for the probability that the sovereign defaults, as the prospect of limited or no access 
to financial markets translated into greater pressure to address macroeconomic imbalances and structural 
issues. 
The splitting of results based on the participation of countries in the MIP supports the existence of a competing 
effect of fiscal balances on implementation and a more nuanced view. The crisis effect, whereby large fiscal 
deficits constrain measures and promote implementation, is offset by a fiscal-space effect, where small fiscal 
deficits mean that fiscal expansion can support implementation in the short-term, for instance by compensating 
the losers from reforms. The former effect clearly dominates in countries that faced macroeconomic 
imbalances, whereas the latter effect manifests itself in those that were not. 
On the contrary, the positions of countries over time in the MIP categorisation cannot explain the variation in 
implementation scores. 
Finally, among the control variables, the likelihood of implementing recommendations increases with higher 
governance quality and more fragmented government coalitions and a lower number of recommendations 
received. In addition, the probability of implementation decreases in an election year in countries with 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Meanwhile, at the level of individual recommendations, measures relevant for the financial sector are 
significantly more likely to be implemented than other recommendations, whereas reforms to broaden the tax 
base, safeguard the sustainability of pension and health systems, and the services sector (business, 
professional services and retail) are less likely to be implemented. Differences between the aforementioned 
policy areas in the urgency of implementation, the political and distributional costs involved, the time required 
to design and agree these reforms among stakeholders, can account for these results. 
In the next section, we perform a number of robustness checks that broadly confirm these results. 
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4.2. Robustness checks 
The results of the main specifications are generally robust to alternative specifications. However, some notable 
differences in results emerge as regards the statistical significance of the coefficients. This section summarises 
these results, which can be found in full in Appendix E. 
First, the effect of including country effects is that nearly all statistically significant results reported in the 
previous section vanish. The addition of 26 dummies on top of the variables of the baseline equation clearly 
strains the exercise. The inclusion of time dummies on top of country effects accentuates this problem. On the 
contrary, the inclusion only of time effects barely changes the main results. In the first specification the election 
year dummy and in the second the excessive imbalance category dummy become statistically significant, but 
only at the 90 percent confidence level.   
Second, specifying a heteroscedasticity equation has the opposite effect, increasing the number of statistical 
significant coefficients. In addition to the results reported in the previous section, statistically significant 
variables include expected real GDP growth (positive effect), elections (negative effect) and the imbalances and 
excessive imbalances categories (positive effect). However, the null hypothesis that the difference in 
implementation between these two MIP categories is zero is still not rejected.  
Finally, the inclusion of the lagged score corroborates the persistent character of implementation but does not 
lead to substantial changes to the results. The only exception is the positive effect of categorisation in 
excessive imbalances in one of the specifications, but still, it is an effect that is statistically significant relative 
to the ‘no imbalances’ category only at the 10 percent level and not statistically significant relative to the 
‘imbalances’ category. 
In conclusion, the robustness checks generally corroborate the main results. In a few specifications, we find a 
statistically significantly differential of categorisation in excessive imbalances compared to no imbalances, but 
only at lower confidence levels. In addition, we find no evidence of a statistically significant implementation 
differential between the excessive imbalances and the imbalances categories.  
5. Conclusion 
We used a newly compiled dataset on European Semester recommendations to identify what drives their 
implementation by member states. We focused on the recommendations given to prevent and correct 
macroeconomic imbalances or to address structural issues and abstracted from fiscal surveillance at the 
European level. We noted two facts from the data. First, implementation has worsened during a period when the 
economic environment has improved and market pressure on sovereigns has subsided. Second, the 
deterioration was driven by the implementation record of countries designated in the excessive imbalances 
category of the MIP. 
We therefore used ordered logistic regressions to evaluate three main hypotheses about what determines 
implementation at the country-level. 
The first is that the implementation of recommendations depends on the economic situation of member states. 
We found that the size of the fiscal and current account deficits increased the likelihood of implementation. In 
relation to fiscal deficits, we interpreted this as a crisis effect, with worse fiscal fundamentals leaving little 
choice to countries but to enact the recommended reforms. However, for countries without macroeconomic 
imbalances, this crisis effect is less important and smaller deficits are more likely to facilitate the 
implementation of reforms.  
The second hypothesis is that financial market pressure drives implementation rates. Financial market pressure 
plays a role: when sovereigns are closer to default, the chance of implementing recommendations increases. 
The result is, however, sensitive to the choice of the measure of market pressure. 
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The third hypothesis is that progress depends on the degree to which European institutions can monitor 
implementation and sanction countries in case of non-compliance. The bulk of the evidence presented does not 
support this hypothesis. We found no evidence of an incremental positive effect on implementation from a 
country being placed in the stricter MIP categories. We found a statistically significant differential in 
implementation between the excessive imbalances and the no imbalances categories only in a few 
specifications, and even then the confidence level was weak compared to other results.  
Beyond testing the main hypotheses, we found that the probability of implementing recommendations 
increases with the quality of governance and the fragmentation of government coalitions, and decreases 
relative to the number of recommendations received. Moreover, for countries in the MIP, implementation slowed 
down during election years. Finally, recommendations on financial services have a much higher chance of being 
implemented. In contrast, the least progress was made on recommendations about the broadening of tax bases, 
the long-term sustainability of public finances and pensions systems, and competition in services.  
The overall message is that pinning down the determinants of countries’ decision to reform is a difficult exercise. 
The empirical model can only explain a fraction of the variation.  The most robust determinant we could find was 
the economic fundamentals. Put simply: good recommendations might be a precious input to national 
policymakers, but reforms will really only be implemented when the time is right politically or the risks are high. 
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Appendix A: Description of implementation scores used by the European 
Commission 
No progress: The member state has not credibly announced nor adopted any measures to address the CSR. 
Below are a number of non-exhaustive typical situations that could be covered under this, to be interpreted on a 
case-by-case basis taking into account country-specific conditions:  
• No legal, administrative, or budgetary measures have been announced in the National Reform 
Programme or in other official communication to the national parliament/relevant parliamentary 
committees, the European Commission, or announced in public (eg in a press statement, information 
on government's website);  
• No non-legislative acts have been presented by the governing or legislator body;  
• The member state has taken initial steps in addressing the CSR, such as commissioning a study or 
setting up a study group to analyse possible measures that would need to be taken (unless the CSR 
explicitly asks for orientations or exploratory actions), while clearly-specified measure(s) to address 
the CSR has not been proposed.  
Limited progress: The member state has:  
• Announced certain measures but these only address the CSR to a limited extent;  
and/or  
• Presented legislative acts in the governing or legislator body but these have not been adopted yet and 
substantial non-legislative further work is needed before the CSR will be implemented;  
• Presented non-legislative acts, yet with no further follow-up in terms of implementation which is 
needed to address the CSR.  
Some progress: The member state has adopted measures that partly address the CSR  
and/or  
• The member state has adopted measures that address the CSR, but a fair amount of work is still needed 
to fully address the CSR as only a few of the adopted measures have been implemented. For instance: 
adopted by national parliament; by ministerial decision; but no implementing decisions are in place.  
Substantial progress: The member state has adopted measures that go a long way in addressing the CSR and 
most of which have been implemented.  
Full implementation: The member state has implemented all measures needed to address the CSR 
appropriately. 
Source: Country Reports.
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Appendix B: List of policy areas 
Policy area Broad policy area 
Fiscal policy and fiscal governance Public finances and taxation 
Long-term sustainability of public finances, including pensions Public finances and taxation 
Reduce the tax burden on labour Public finances and taxation 
Broaden the tax bases Public finances and taxation 
Reduce the debt bias Public finances and taxation 
Fight against tax evasion, improve tax administration & tackle tax 
avoidance Public finances and taxation 
Financial services Financial sector 
Housing market Financial sector 
Access to finance Financial sector 
Private indebtedness Financial sector 
Employment protection legislation and framework for labour 
contracts Labour market 
Unemployment benefits Labour market 
Active labour market policies Labour market 
Incentives to work, job creation, labour market participation Labour market 
Wages and wage-setting Labour market 
Childcare Social inclusion and education 
Health and long-term care Social inclusion and education 
Poverty reduction and social inclusion Social inclusion and education 
Education Social inclusion and education 
Skills and life-long learning Social inclusion and education 
Research and innovation Structural policies 
Competition and regulatory framework Structural policies 
Competition in services Structural policies 
Telecom, postal services and local public services Structural policies 
Energy, resources and climate change Structural policies 
Transport Structural policies 
Business environment 
Public administration and business 
environment 
Insolvency framework 
Public administration and business 
environment 
Public administration 
Public administration and business 
environment 
State-owned enterprises 
Public administration and business 
environment 
Civil justice 
Public administration and business 
environment 
Shadow economy and corruption 
Public administration and business 
environment 
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Appendix C: Description and sources of variables  
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable: 
implementation score 
Categorical variable; 0 = no progress; 1 = limited progress; 2 = some progress; 3 = substantial progress; 4 = fully addressed European Commission 
Country Reports 
Imbalances Dummy variable; 1 = country classified in the "imbalances" category, 0 = otherwise European Commission In-
depth reviews 
Excessive imbalances Dummy variable; 1 = country classified in the "excessive imbalances" category, 0 = otherwise European Commision In-
depth reviews 
General government net 
lending (% of GDP) [lagged] 
AMECO code UBLG. The lagged value (for year t) corresponds to the value for year t-1 appearing in the European 
Commission forecast published in the spring of year t. 
AMECO 
Current account balance (% of 
GDP) [lagged] 
AMECO code UBCA. The lagged value (for year t) corresponds to the value for year t-1 appearing in the European 
Commission forecast published in the spring of year t. The current account series for Croatia in the 2018 forecast contained 
several missing values so for 2017 we used the value from the 2017 forecast. 
AMECO 
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged] AMECO code OVGD. The lagged value (for year t) corresponds to the value for year t-1 appearing in the European 
Commission forecast published in the spring of year t. 
AMECO 
Expected real GDP growth 5 
years out (%) [lagged] 
Real GDP growth forecast for year t+5. World Economic Outlook 
1Y sovereign default 
probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 
Probability of sovereign default inferred from empirical model with inputs being: GDP growth, Economist Intelligence Unit 
Political Risk Score and non-performing bank loans ratio for all countries; government surplus and refinancing ability for 
those countries issuing debt only in their own currency (in our sample all euro area countries, Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK); reserves to external debt for all other countries.  
Bloomberg 
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-
May)] 
Average of daily closing price, January to May Bloomberg 
Election year Dummy variable; 1 = if legislative (also presidential for Cyprus, France, Lithuania and Poland) elections held, 0 = otherwise. 
We update this variable into 2018 and in some instances correct its values. 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2017 
Average of World Governance 
Indicators estimates 
Average of six governance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. These indicators are capturing perceptions 
and measure countries' relative performance, not absolute levels. Each indicator is a continuous variable ranging from -2.5 
to 2.5. We use 2017 values for 2018 (not available). 
World Bank 
Herfindahl Index of 
Government Parties 
Defined as ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1  , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  is the ratio of parliament seats of party 𝑖𝑖 to the total seats of the government majority in 
parliament and 𝑁𝑁 is the number of parties in government. We update this variable into 2018 and in some instances correct 
its values. 
Database of Political 
Institutions 2017 
Number of subparts Total number of recommendations per country (in a given year). Country-specific 
recommendations 
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Appendix D: Summary of models and assumptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baseline Time fixed effects (FE) Country fixed effects (FE) Country and time FE Baseline with heteroskedasticity 
Equation 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗∗ = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗′𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗  
 
Error assumptions 𝜀𝜀~𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(0,1) 𝜀𝜀~𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(0,1) 
 
𝜀𝜀~𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(0,1) 𝜀𝜀~𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(0,1) 
 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗~𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙(0, exp (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗[𝑝𝑝=𝑝𝑝0]′𝜃𝜃)) 
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Appendix E: Additional results 
Table 3: Ordered logistic regression marginal effects 
 All All MIP MIP non MIP non MIP 
Imbalances 0.04 0.03     
 (1.42) (1.37)     
Excessive imbalances 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.02   
 (1.09) (1.57) (0.36) (0.63)   
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged] 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.62) (0.32) (0.61) (0.07) (0.59) (1.28) 
Expected real GDP growth 5 years out (%) 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (1.06) (0.37) (0.55) (0.18) (0.72) (0.23) 
General government net lending (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.02 
 (6.18) (7.08) (7.63) (8.45) (1.26) (1.46) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (2.60) (2.64) (1.61) (1.46) (2.35) (2.93) 
1Y sovereign default probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 0.01***  0.01***  0.04**  
 (3.07)  (2.64)  (2.18)  
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-May)]  -0.00  -0.00  0.00*** 
  (0.04)  (1.41)  (4.04) 
Election year -0.03* -0.03 -0.05*** -0.04* -0.01 -0.02 
 (1.66) (1.33) (2.60) (1.85) (0.21) (0.67) 
Average of World Governance Indicators estimates 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.05* 0.14** 0.20*** 
 (4.14) (3.26) (2.86) (1.80) (2.25) (3.33) 
Herfindahl Index of Government Parties -0.08** -0.09** -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 
 (2.13) (2.44) (0.66) (0.50) (0.87) (0.75) 
Number of subparts -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.01** 
 (2.54) (1.80) (2.45) (1.93) (1.40) (2.38) 
Pseudo R2       
Observations 1816 1816 1102 1102 714 714 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
Notes: Includes policy area dummies. Country-year clustered standard errors. 5Y CDS for Luxembourg and Malta are Bloomberg model estimates. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 4: Ordered logistic regression results, fixed effects 
 Time effects Time effects Country effects Country effects Both effects Both effects 
Dependent variable: implementation score       
Imbalances 0.26 0.25 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.06 
 (1.54) (1.49) (0.60) (0.09) (0.73) (0.24) 
Excessive imbalances 0.29 0.41* 0.55 0.44 0.56 0.47 
 (1.15) (1.66) (1.60) (1.21) (1.64) (1.24) 
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged] 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 
 (0.70) (0.46) (1.01) (0.42) (1.09) (0.41) 
Expected real GDP growth 5 years out (%) 0.09 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.74) (0.12) (0.33) (0.21) (0.38) (0.26) 
General government net lending (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.04 -0.10* -0.05 -0.10* 
 (6.00) (6.66) (0.82) (1.67) (0.87) (1.77) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (2.74) (2.77) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34) 
1Y sovereign default probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 0.10***  0.17***  0.17***  
 (2.96)  (2.77)  (2.85)  
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-May)]  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.19)  (0.11)  (0.30) 
Election year -0.24* -0.20 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.13 
 (1.74) (1.41) (1.14) (0.93) (1.20) (0.97) 
Average of World Governance Indicators estimates 0.87*** 0.64***     
 (3.60) (2.79)     
Herfindahl Index of Government Parties -0.56** -0.64** -0.84* -0.96* -0.85* -0.98* 
 (2.13) (2.37) (1.72) (1.87) (1.73) (1.88) 
Number of subparts -0.03** -0.03* -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (2.46) (1.93) (0.46) (0.04) (0.43) (0.10) 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.077 0.094 0.092 0.095 0.092 
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. chi-sq. 0.01 0.63 2.51 2.25 2.16 1.95 
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. p-value 0.91 0.43 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.16 
Observations 1816 1816 1816 1816 1816 1816 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
Notes: Includes policy area dummies. Country-year clustered standard errors. 5Y CDS for Luxembourg and Malta are Bloomberg model estimates. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 5: Ordered logistic regression results, other specifications 
 Heteroscedasticity 
equation 
Heteroscedasticity 
equation 
Lagged implementation 
score 
Lagged implementation 
score 
Dependent variable: implementation score     
Imbalances 0.18* 0.17* 0.22 0.20 
 (1.91) (1.86) (1.34) (1.21) 
Excessive imbalances 0.26* 0.32** 0.31 0.47* 
 (1.94) (2.21) (1.27) (1.95) 
Country implementation score (0-100) [lagged]   0.02*** 0.03*** 
   (3.31) (3.70) 
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged] 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.02 
 (0.45) (0.13) (0.89) (0.43) 
Expected real GDP growth 5 years out (%) 0.16** 0.11* 0.16 0.08 
 (2.54) (1.87) (1.63) (0.74) 
General government net lending (% of GDP) 
[lagged] 
-0.11*** -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (4.32) (4.51) (5.12) (5.61) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) [lagged] -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04** -0.04* 
 (3.15) (3.19) (2.00) (1.91) 
1Y sovereign default probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 0.07***  0.11***  
 (2.79)  (3.29)  
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-May)]  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.03)  (0.61) 
Election year -0.20** -0.18** -0.15 -0.11 
 (2.48) (2.33) (1.07) (0.75) 
Average of World Governance Indicators 
estimates 
0.76*** 0.57*** 1.00*** 0.68*** 
 (4.30) (3.90) (4.56) (2.99) 
Herfindahl Index of Government Parties -0.34** -0.38** -0.43 -0.53* 
 (2.17) (2.52) (1.58) (1.89) 
Number of subparts -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02** 
 (3.02) (2.74) (2.87) (2.08) 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.116 0.087 0.084 
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. chi-sq. 0.55 1.55 0.21 1.96 
H0: Exc. imb. = imb. p-value 0.46 0.21 0.64 0.16 
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Observations 1816 1816 1746 1746 
Absolute t statistics in parentheses 
Notes: Includes policy area dummies. Country-year clustered standard errors. 5Y CDS for Luxembourg and Malta are Bloomberg model estimates.  In regressions (3) and (4) the lagged country implementation 
score for 2013 (i.e. the 2012 score) is caluclated at the CSR-level. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Appendix F: Summary statistics 
Implementation scores, distribution 
 
Implementation scores, distribution (by year) 
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Implementation scores, distribution (by country) 
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Variable (country – year level) Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Real GDP growth (%) [lagged)] 2.00 1.92 -2.37 7.81 
Expected real GDP growth 5 years out (%) 2.26 0.83 0.77 4.01 
General government net lending (% of GDP) [lagged)] -2.00 2.34 -14.71 3.93 
Current account balance (% of GDP) [lagged)] 1.95 3.89 -8.07 12.56 
1Y sovereign default probability (%) [(Jan-May)] 1.10 1.94 0.01 11.30 
5Y CDS spread (bps) [(Jan-May)] 80.19 70.43 9.56 316.41 
Election year 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Average of World Governance Indicators estimates 1.07 0.47 0.13 1.85 
Herfindahl Index of Government Parties 0.64 0.26 0.19 1.00 
Number of subparts 13.24 8.13 1.00 46.00 
Observations 156 
    
Policy areas Share 
Access to finance 0.02 
Financial services 0.05 
Housing market 0.02 
Private indebtedness 0.02 
Active labour market policies 0.07 
Employment protection legislation and framework for labour contracts 0.02 
Incentives to work; job creation; labour market participation 0.12 
Unemployment benefits 0.01 
Wages and wage-setting 0.03 
Business environment 0.05 
Civil justice 0.02 
Insolvency framework 0.01 
Public administration 0.07 
Shadow economy and corruption 0.03 
State-owned enterprises 0.03 
Broaden the tax bases 0.04 
Fight against tax evasion; improve tax administration & tackle tax avoidance 0.04 
Fiscal policy and fiscal governance 0.08 
Long-term sustainability of public finances; including pensions 0.09 
Reduce the debt bias 0.01 
Reduce the tax burden on labour 0.03 
Childcare 0.02 
Education 0.08 
Health and long-term care 0.05 
Poverty reduction and social inclusion 0.08 
Skills and life-long learning 0.06 
Competition and regulatory framework 0.03 
Competition in services 0.04 
Energy; resources and climate change 0.06 
Research and innovation 0.04 
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Telecom; postal services and local public services 0.01 
Transport 0.03 
Observations 1901 
 
